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1.	Introduction	
This	paper	is	concerned	with	collective	bargaining	as	practiced	in	the	Irish	film	industry.	I	begin	with	a	brief	discussion	of	the	relative	invisibility	in	the	communications	literature	of	film	and	television	labour	issues,	and	some	of	the	implications	of	that	omission.	In	the	second	section,	I	describe	the	process	by	which	film	labour	agreements	are	negotiated	in	Ireland,	noting	some	surface	similarities	with	the	situation	in	the	USA	and	the	UK,	in	which	territories	the	bulk	of	incoming	film	production	work	originates.	In	the	third	section,	by	way	of	a	case	study,	I	examine	a	lengthy	negotiation	process	between	Screen	Producers	Ireland	and	Irish	Equity,	as	both	parties	tried	to	update	their	standard	agreement	covering	the	employment	of	actors	on	Irish	film	and	television	drama	productions.	Finally,	in	the	fourth	section,	I	attempt	to	draw	some	conclusions	from	the	issues	emerging	during	these	negotiations.	Although	they	failed	to	result	in	a	final,	ratified	agreement,	the	negotiations	nevertheless	highlight	aspects	of	the	changing	landscape	of	film	and	TV	drama	production	in	Ireland,	the	increasing	centrality	of	intellectual	property	rights,	and	the	implications	for	film	workers.	The	case	also	affords	some	insights	into	the	role	of	trade	unions	in	the	so-called	independent	sector	of	the	film	and	TV	industry	in	Ireland.1			My	study	is	based	primarily	on	the	analysis	of	documents	archived	by	SIPTU,	historically	the	most	important	union	for	the	organization	and	representation	of	Irish	film	and	television	workers.	These	archives	offer	an	extensive,	relatively	
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untapped	source	of	rich	data	from	which	to	construct	a	history	of	film	and	TV	production	in	Ireland	from	a	labour	perspective.	This	reflects	my	interest	in	the	labour	process	at	play	in	the	production	of	film	and	television	texts,	a	viewpoint	largely	eschewed	in	favour	of	the	analysis	of	the	institutions	that	produce	such	content,	the	inherent	meaning	of	the	texts	themselves,	and	the	processes	by	which	such	meanings	are	created,	subverted	and	otherwise	negotiated	by	audiences.	The	research	thus	addresses	what	Mosco	(2011:	358)	calls	the	“labour	blind	spot”	of	western	communications	studies.	Despite	the	large	body	of	theoretical	work	begun	by	Braverman,	looking	at	the	labour	process	and	its	commodification	at	the	point	of	production,	communications	studies	has	tended	to	view	individuals	as	consumers	rather	than	producers.	Media	consumption	is	privileged,	with	little	attention	paid	to	labour	aspects	of	the	production	process.2	
1a.	The	creative	blind	spot?	
Added	to	this	error	of	academic	omission	has	been	the	distortion	of	media	labour	realities	by	administrative	researchers	and	government	policy	makers	in	recent	decades.	Creative	labour	and	creative	industries	have	been	central	to	21st	century	“knowledge	economy”	policy	that	seeks	to	reimagine	cultural	activity	–	unjustifiably,	according	to	Garnham	(2005)	–	as	a	key	element	of	post-industrial	economic	growth.	Relatedly,	creative	activity	has	been	promoted	as	a	solution	to	US	urban	decay,	through	the	establishment	of	creative	industrial	clusters	as	a	means	of	regenerating	the	“hollowed	out”	American	city	(Florida	2002;	see	also	Markusen	et	al.	2008).	The	attending	discourse	articulates	“a	highly	neoliberal	approach	to	creativity	and	creative	work,	aligned	to	economic	productivity	and	regional	development”	(Lee	2011:	3).	Pro-creative	policy,	including	measures	to	ensure	a	steady	supply	of	creative	workers,	is	seen	as	a	key	source	of	competitive	advantage	for	post-industrial	economies,	and	is	central	to	quasi-progressive	development	concepts	like	“smart	economy”,	“knowledge	work”	and	so	on.	In	this	scenario,	creative	activity	is	big	business;	and	creative	work	is	intrinsically	progressive	and	rewarding.	Creative	labour	therefore	claims	to	be	a	model	of	work	that	is	valued	in	modern	societies:	“good	work”	that	is	“self-expressive,	autonomous	and	individualised”	in	contrast	to	the	dull,	alienating	employment	
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(“bad	work”)	of	the	previous	era.	Creative	work	is	seen	as	self-actualising	pleasure,	a	leisure-like	activity	promising	personal	freedom,	as	opposed	to	a	sense	of	imprisonment	implied	by	material	necessity	and	survival	(Banks	and	Hesmondhalgh	2009:	417).			This	utopic	portrait	of	creative	labour	has	activated	a	considerable	backlash	in	recent	years,	as	a	number	of	critical	investigations	have	exposed	the	precarity,	insecurity	and	exploitation	at	the	heart	of	much	creative	work	(e.g.	Ursell	2000;	McRobbie	1998,	2002,	2002a;	Ross	2008;	Hesmondhalgh	and	Baker	2011;	Grugulis	and	Stoyanova	2012;	Perlin	2012).	These	studies	support	David	Harvey’s	contention	that	freelancing,	the	modus	operandi	of	many	creative	occupations,	is	a	form	of	labour	control	under,	rather	than	liberation	from,	the	domination	of	capital.	Indeed	post-Fordist	flexible	specialisation,	at	the	heart	of	the	freelance	model	of	work	organization,	becomes	an	inherently	oppressive	facet	of	flexible	accumulation	(Harvey	2005:	76).	Flexible	specialisation	is	thus	central	to	capitalism’s	neoliberal	turn,	which	aims,	inter	alia,	to	dismantle	the	“embedded	liberalism”	of	post-war	social	democracy	(ibid:	11).	The	result	is	an	upwards	redistribution	of	wealth,	a	“restoration	or	formation	of	class	power”,	achieved	“as	always,	at	the	expense	of	labour”	(ibid.:	76).		My	interest	in	production	labour,	then,	places	this	study	clearly	at	the	“industry”	apex	of	the	media	studies	triangle,	but	at	the	meso	level	of	industrial	practice,	with	an	interest	in	labour	relations	and	the	labour	process.	This	framework	is	drawn	from	critical	media	industry	studies	(CMIS),	a	distinctive	approach	located	at	the	intersection	of	cultural	studies	and	political	economy.	Although	it	is	aware	of	“macro”	political	economy	approaches	that	seek	to	understand	the	implications	of	media	ownership,	policy	and	regulation,	CMIS	takes	a	“mid-level”	focus	on	individual	“organizations,	agents	and	practices”,	in	the	context	of	global	media	conglomeration	(Havens,	Lotz	and	Tinic	2009:	234).	In	this	approach,	the	film	and	television	production	industry	in	Ireland	is	understood	in	terms	of	its	place	within	the	international	division	of	cultural	labour,	dominated	by	the	Hollywood-centred	entertainment	industrial	complex,	radiating	outward	into	a	
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globalised	production	model	in	order	to	reduce	production	costs	and	increase	profits	(Miller	et	al.	2005).		We	therefore	address	Guback’s	(1991:	134)	contention	that	“the	objective	character	of	film	is	its	status	as	a	commodity”,	a	“fundamental	reality”	that	film	studies	must	take	into	consideration.	As	commercial	film	and	television	content,	produced	for	exchange	in	the	international	marketplace,	is	highly	labour	intensive,	the	film	commodity	serves	as	an	ideal	reminder	of	the	vital	role	of	labour	in	capital	accumulation	(ibid.).	However,	as	Mosco	has	noted,	there	is	a	tendency	to	obscure	this	reality	behind	a	romanticised	view	of	media	work,	emphasising	“the	individual	creative	dimensions	of	media	production	that	distinguish	this	sector	from	the	many	occupational	sectors	that	share	the	characteristics	of	industrial	production”	(Mosco	2011:	360).	Thus	the	complex	production	process	underlying	media	content	–	a	process	that	mirrors	industrial	production	generally	-	is	concealed	through	the	glamorisation	of	star	performers,	
auteur	directors,	celebrity	writers,	and	so	on.	This	“praising	[of]	famous	men”	(Chanan	1976:	v)	has	become	a	defining	feature	of	the	top	down	perspective	typically	adopted	by	existing	cinema	histories,	concerned	as	they	are	with	individual	contributors,	pioneering	techniques,	changing	definitions	of	art,	etc.	Dismissing	such	approaches	as	irrelevant	for	the	material	analysis	of	the	industry,	Nielsen	instead	calls	for	a	bottom	up	account,	claiming	for	such	perspective	a	greater	relevance	to	the	understanding	of	film	as	a	collaborative	industrial	process	(Nielsen	1983:	47).	That	is	one	goal	of	the	research	presented	here.		
1b.	A	“proto	neoliberal”	Irish	film	policy?	
Filmmaking	in	Ireland	has	been	outward-looking	since	the	earliest	days	of	the	medium.	It	is	generally	accepted	that	Ireland	hosted	the	first	overseas	Hollywood	productions:	the	Kalem	Company	body	of	films	that	commenced	with	The	Lad	
from	Old	Ireland	in	1910	(Flynn	and	Brereton	2007:	xxiv).	It	would	be	the	late	1950s,	however,	before	Irish	economic	and	employment	policy	became	properly	oriented	towards	inward	investment	as	the	state	sought	to	redress	the	failed	economic	development	policies	of	earlier	decades.	Under	the	liberalising	
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influence	of	Taoiseach	Sean	Lemass	and	his	economic	advisor	T.	K.	Whitaker,	foreign	direct	investment	in	the	Irish	economy	was	incentivised	through	capital	grants,	employment	subsidies,	and	tax	concessions	(O’Connor	2010).	Filmmaking	in	Ireland	would	become	a	small	but	perhaps	disproportionately	visible	element	of	this	strategy,	as	the	state	bankrolled	the	Ardmore	Studios	complex	in	1958,	hoping	to	kick-start	an	indigenous	film	production	industry	through	the	capture	of	“runaway”	international	production	(Monahan	2009:	201-2;	Rockett	1988:	98-100).			Hollywood	filmmaking,	then,	presents	as	an	early	example	of	a	globalised	industry,	while	the	film	industry	in	Ireland	presents	as	a	test	case	for	the	foreign	direct	investment	model	of	economic	development,	coinciding	with	an	arguably	proto-neoliberal	industrial	development	policy	from	the	1950s	(Evans	2011:	4)	mobilised	to	solve	the	perennial	Irish	problem	of	unemployment	(O’Connor	2010).	What	kind	of	film	employment,	though,	might	be	generated	under	such	conditions?	Would	the	work	be	well	paid	and	personally	fulfilling	or	poorly	paid	and	alienating	–	would	it,	to	employ	Hesmondhalgh	and	Baker’s	(2011)	deceptively	simple	distinction,	be	“good	work”	or	“bad	work”?	Would	the	Irish	film	industry	feature	autonomous,	self-actualised	workers,	well	organised	by	strong	unions	as	in	the	UK	and	the	USA,	or	would	there	be	evidence	for	what	David	Harvey	(among	others)	has	identified	as	a	major	precondition	for	global	capital	flow:	the	“use	[of]	state	power	to	crush	organised	labour”	(Harvey	2010:	14)?	I	have	argued	elsewhere	that	this	is	precisely	what	happened	when	the	industry	experienced	its	first	and	only	significant	industrial	disputes	in	1963	and	1964	–	ultimately	precipitating	the	temporary	dissolution	of	Ardmore	Studios	when	it	was	placed	into	receivership	in	order	to	negate	a	labour	agreement	with	the	“troublesome”	Electrical	Trades	Union	Ireland	(Murphy	2013).	This	paper,	however,	is	concerned	with	some	of	the	more	subtle	implications	for	labour	relations	under	a	regime	of	neoliberal	accumulation,	characterised	by	the	commercialisation	of	previously	uncharted	areas,	including	the	intellectual	property	rights	underlying	a	film	worker’s	contribution	to	the	film	commodity.		
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2.	Collective	Bargaining	in	the	Irish	Film	Industry	
Pay	and	working	conditions	in	Irish	film	and	TV	drama	production	are	governed,	in	principle	at	least,	by	a	number	of	separate	labour	agreements	between	employers	and	workers.	Employer	interests	are	represented	by	Screen	Producers	Ireland	(SPI),	whose	membership	extends	to	130	or	so	production	firms.	SPI	represents	these	firms	in	dealings	with	the	various	broadcasting	companies,	the	Irish	Film	Board,	various	government	departments,	state	and	international	organizations,	and	also,	of	course,	the	relevant	trade	unions	and	guilds.			Film	workers	are	represented	by	a	number	of	trade	unions.	The	“below	the	line”	unions	are	SIPTU3	(representing	production	technicians	and	some	craft	grades);	BATU	(construction-related	grades);	TEEU	(electricians);	and	OPATSI	(plasterers).4	“Above	the	line”	workers	are	represented	in	the	main	by	Irish	Equity	(IE)5,	the	Writers	Guild	of	Ireland,	and	the	Screen	Directors	Guild	of	Ireland.		Over	the	years,	SPI	and	its	predecessors	have	negotiated	a	number	of	separate,	collectively	bargained	labour	agreements	with	SIPTU	and	the	various	craft	unions.	SPI	has	also	negotiated	agreements	with	IE.	The	Writer	and	Director	Guilds,	however,	have	not	signed	any	agreements,	although	initial	approaches	have	been	made	in	recent	years.	Indeed	there	is	a	fundamental	conflict	between	SPI	and	these	above-the-line	organizations,	all	of	which	are	interested	in	the	retention,	to	one	degree	or	another,	of	intellectual	property	rights.	Such	rights,	a	cornerstone	of	neoliberal	accumulation	strategies,	have	proven	to	be	a	major	point	of	contention	between	SPI	and	Equity	in	recent	years,	as	we	shall	see	below.		On	the	surface,	the	Irish	collective	bargaining	process	looks	similar	to	the	UK	and	USA.	In	Britain,	the	producers	body	PACT	negotiates	agreements	below	the	line	with	BECTU	and	above	the	line	with	Equity,	the	Writers	Guild	of	Great	Britain	
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(WGGB)	and	the	Directors	Guilds	of	Great	Britain	(DGGB).	In	the	US,	the	equivalent	organizations	are	the	Alliance	of	Motion	Picture	and	Television	Producers	(AMPTP)	which	negotiates	80	industry-wide	agreements	with	the	International	Alliance	of	Theatrical	and	Stage	Employees	(IATSE),	the	International	Brotherhood	of	Electrical	Workers	(IBEW),	Teamsters	local	399,	the	American	Federation	of	Musicians	(AFM),	the	performers	guild	SAG-AFTRA,	the	Writers	Guild	of	America,	and	the	Directors	Guild	of	America	(AMPTP	2014)	(Appendix	I).		Despite	this	surface	similarity,	there	are	some	important	differences	in	how	collective	bargaining	is	practiced	in	these	various	jurisdictions.	As	we	shall	see	below,	the	Irish	unions	and	guilds	have	not	been	able	to	update	their	labour	agreements	–	if	they	have	one	at	all	–	with	SPI.	This	has	implications	for	both	sides,	but	would	appear	to	favour	Producers,	for	reasons	we	shall	see	below.		
2a.	The	question	of	residuals	
The	various	Irish,	British	and	US	agreements	differ	from	each	other	not	so	much	in	terms	of	pay	and	working	conditions	per	se,	but	rather	in	the	treatment	of	secondary	or	“residual”	payments	–	defined	as		
additional	payments	to	workers	for	the	exhibition	of	an	entertainment	product	in	media	other	than	the	one	for	which	it	was	originally	created,	or	for	its	reuse	within	the	same	medium	subsequent	to	the	initial	exhibition	(Paul	&	Kleingartner	1994:	668-9)	Essentially,	residuals	constitute	an	additional	annuity	as	a	performance	is	reused	and/or	repurposed	over	its	commercial	lifetime.	These	payments	are	an	important	constituent	of	the	three-tier	compensation	system	enjoyed	by	US	screen	actors	(along	with	directors	and	writers).	That	system	comprises:		
1. A	minimum	pay	regime,	sometimes	known	as	“union	scale”	(typically	applied	only	to	the	least	experienced	individual	who	has	little	or	no	bargaining	influence	or	“clout”).	
	 8	
1. The	personal	services	contract,	whereby	more	well	known	or	“marketable”	workers	may	be	able	to	negotiate	a	higher	daily	rate,	a	percentage	of	box	office	receipts	or	net	profits	(points),	a	cut	of	merchandise	sales,	as	well	as	non-monetary	perks	such	as	“above	the	line”	accreditation,	better	location	facilities,	personal	assistants,	and	so	on.	
2. Residual	payments,	which	tend	to	accrue	in	dribs	and	drabs	over	the	lifetime	of	the	performance	in	all	media.	These	are	usually	payable	to	all	actors,	and	have	proved	especially	valuable	to	those	at	the	lower	end	of	the	pay	scale.	In	other	words,	the	lower	the	actor’s	total	annual	income,	the	greater	the	proportion	of	that	income	that	stems	from	residuals.6	
The	residual	system	has	further	benefits:	the	steady	stream	of	small	monthly	payments	reduces	the	effect	of	underemployment,	a	perennial	problem	in	the	acting	profession.	But	perhaps	more	importantly,	they	allow	workers	to	“relate	the	control	of	creative	resources	to	their	ownership”	–	by	retaining	ownership	of	their	own	performances,	actors	are	compensated	for	the	potentially	income-damaging	consequences	of	overexposure	as	producers	understandably	try	to	maximise	their	return	of	investment	through	“exploitation”	(in	the	telling	industry	argot)	through	as	many	channels	as	possible,	as	often	as	possible	(Paul	and	Kleingartner	1994:	672)		While	these	additional	compensation	systems	tend	to	be	of	most	benefit	to	actors	and	directors	whose	box-office	marketability	gives	them	considerable	negotiating	power,	benefits	also	accrue	“below	the	line”,	although	on	a	more	collective,	egalitarian	basis.	Instead	of	individual	residual	payments,	secondary	contributions	are	made	directly	by	employers	to	the	Motion	Picture	Industry	Pension	Plan	and	the	Motion	Picture	Industry	Health	and	Welfare	fund,	benefitting	the	IATSE	union	membership	as	a	whole	(Kleingartner	2001:	118-9).		
2b.	SPI,	Equity	and	residuals	
In	Ireland,	secondary	payments	have	traditionally	been	treated	in	a	different	way.	Rather	than	a	residual	system,	the	practice,	at	least	since	the	1990s,	has	
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been	the	payment	of	“use	fees”,	in	which	actors	are	paid,	in	advance,	for	the	anticipated	reuse	of	the	performance	in	different	media	and	different	markets	(see	Appendix	2).	Typically,	the	payment	of	a	use	fee	category	assigns	the	related	performance	rights	to	the	producer,	removing	any	future	claim	on	the	part	of	the	performer.	There	were,	and	continue	to	be,	different	fee	schedules	for	theatrical	and	TV	drama	production.	Under	the	1994	Equity	agreement,	the	payment	of	a	film	actor’s	standard	fee	of	£100	per	day,	or	£400	per	week,	did	not	include	any	usage	rights.	The	producer	had	to	top	up	this	performance	fee	by	at	least	another	50	percent,	to	purchase	one	of	two	release	“territories”	(USA/Canada	or	Rest	of	World).	Additional	uses	could	be	“bought	out”	with	further	amounts,	payable	in	advance.	These	payments	ranged	from	20	percent	(for	Ireland	and	UK	TV	rights)	to	273	percent	(for	worldwide	rights	to	all	media	–	including	future	media	–	“in	perpetuity”).7	A	different	scale	applied	for	TV	drama	production.	So	in	contrast	to	the	US	system	of	trailing	“pay	per	play”	residuals,	the	Irish	system	was	based	on	upfront	payments.	Effectively,	this	use-fee	structure	allowed	producers	to	
avoid	making	residual	payments,	and	the	payment	of	the	maximum	use	fee	obviated	any	potential	actor	claim	for	further	compensation.		Apart	from	the	timing	of	payments,	on	the	surface	both	systems	appear	relatively	similar.	If	anything,	the	use	fee	system	would	appear	to	benefit	actors,	who	don’t	have	to	wait	for	small	residual	payments	down	the	line.	For	producers,	however,	the	option	of	the	full	buyout	offers	the	administrative	simplicity	of	the	single	upfront	payment,	with	no	need	to	worry	about	a	complex	system	of	small	future		residual	payments.	Furthermore,	as	the	full	buyout	effectively	removes	an	actor’s	claim	to	further	compensation,	producers	don’t	have	to	think	about	profit	sharing	if	and	when	new	revenues	are	generated	through	new	media.8		
	
3.	The	SPI-Equity	Negotiations	
Towards	the	end	of	2000,	IE	commenced	negotiations	with	Film	Makers	Ireland	(the	predecessor	of	today’s	SPI),	to	update	their	1994	labour	agreement.9	In	its	opening	move,	the	union	compiled	a	set	of	draft	proposals	based	almost	entirely	
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on	the	1998	UK	cinema	films	agreement	between	Equity’s	UK	counterpart	and	the	producers	body,	PACT.10	In	comparison	to	the	existing	nine-page	agreement,	the	new	draft	document	ran	to	74	pages,	reflecting,	perhaps,	the	complexity	of	UK	actor-producer	labour	relations	in	comparison	to	the	Irish	situation.			The	producers’	initial	response	outlined	a	number	of	areas	of	concern.		In	relation	to	pay	and	working	conditions,	they	were	concerned	about	proposed	increases	in	minimum	pay	rates	and	changes	to	working	hours	that	would	also	impact	on	overtime	rates.11	They	seemed	more	concerned,	however,	about	proposals	impacting	on	intellectual	property	rights	–	i.e.	the	ownership	of	the	filmed	performance,	and	the	extent	to	which	such	ownership	rested	with	the	production	company	or	with	the	original	actor.12	A	union	proposal	to	increase	the	maximum	use	fee13	through	the	addition	of	a	new	“secondary	TV”	rights	category	was	“not	acceptable	to	producers”,	who	insisted	“the	whole	issue	of	minimum	fees	and	residuals	needs	to	be	addressed	again”.14	The	employer	position	was	that	production	companies	must	retain	its	option,	under	the	old	agreement,	to	buy	out	these	rights.	If	a	distribution	category	was	not	specifically	mentioned	in	the	agreement,	it	must	be	deemed	“included	and	bought	out”.15	IE’s	attempt	to	introduce	additional	payments	to	cover	exploitation	channels	not	specifically	covered	elsewhere	in	the	agreement	was	therefore	unacceptable:	
…	the	basic	salary	and	use	payments	buy	out	all	media	now	known	or	to	be	invented	worldwide	in	perpetuity	…	and	rights	of	communication	to	the	public	by	cable	satellite	and	otherwise.	Any	other	arrangement	is	unacceptable.16		It	is	clear	that	Irish	producers	wanted	to	prevent	the	creation	of	any	new	use	fee	categories,	including	those	that	might	stem	from	distribution	channels	not	yet	invented	or	popularised,	such	as	VOD	or	any	other	distribution	method	emerging	from	new	technology.			Despite	the	uncertainties	of	these	new	channels,	some	Irish	actors	seemed	confident	that	residual	payments,	which	were	available	to	actors	in	the	UK,	might	be	a	more	favourable	form	of	compensation	than	use	fees.	The	salience	of	this	
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issue	to	working	actors	is	strongly	reflected	in	a	letter	one	actor	wrote	to	Equity	president	Gerry	Browne,	as	the	FMI-Equity	negotiations	continued:		
Residuals/secondary	payments	are	only	fair	at	this	point.	Exploitation	of	image	needs	to	be	reimbursed.	The	producers	or	the	crew	do	not	have	to	deal	with	this	issue	–	only	the	actors.	Now	that	British	Equity	has	resolved	this	issue	in	order	to	have	parity	with	our	sister	Union	we	must	have	residuals.	No	more	buy	outs.	I	have	always	believed	that	Irish	Actors	have	been	sold	down	the	river	on	this	one.	17		
3a.	TV	Agreement	
As	negotiations	continued,	producers	pushed	for	a	separate	agreement	to	cover	television	production.	At	these	deliberations,	commenced	in	September	2003,	a	number	of	issues	emerged.	At	the	outset,	SPI	claimed	to	be	under	pressure	from	RTÉ	to	reduce	production	costs.	The	broadcaster	was	suggesting	its	in-house	production	Fair	City	as	an	example	of	how	to	“demonstrate	value	for	money”.18	SPI	pointed	out	that	all	contracts	(including	actor	contracts)	were	subject	to	RTÉ	approval,	implying	that	the	matter	was	partly	out	of	its	hands.	SPI	therefore	objected	to	any	attempt	to	base	pay	rates	and	use	fees	on	the	equivalent	UK	rates.	(This	was	consistent	with	their	position	on	film	acting	rates,	where	SPI	felt	Ireland	needed	to	be	more	“competitive”	than	the	UK	to	secure	inward	investment.)19		Some	six	weeks	later,	SPI	presented	its	own	draft	of	the	mooted	TV	agreement,	proposing	a	basic	pay	increase,20	coupled	with	a	sizeable	reduction	in	use	fees.	SPI	wanted	to	reduce	the	cost	of	full	buyout	from	257.5	to	167.5	percent	of	base	(see	Appendix	IIb).	SPI	claimed	the	new	figure	was	more	realistic,	as	the	old	schedule	contained	categories	that	were	never	used.	Aware,	of	course,	that	any	reduction	in	the	nominal	“full	buyout”	rate	would	reduce	the	cost	to	producers	of	buying	out	media	not	specifically	mentioned	in	the	agreement,	Equity	deemed	this	unacceptable,	along	with	SPI	proposals	to	increase	the	number	of	Ireland/UK	transmissions	in	the	standard	buyout	from	two	to	three.	The	union	
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countered	with	a	proposal	to	limit	the	lifetime	of	the	buyout	to	seven	years.	The	haggling	over	use	fees	continued	with	SPI	noting	that	pay	rates	on	“flagship”	television	drama	productions	often	featured	a	discounted	use	fee	–	implying	that	producer-friendly	deviations	from	currently	agreed	rates	were	the	norm.21			In	addition	to	the	discussion	over	use	fees	and	basic	pay	rates,	there	was	also	discussion	about	maximum	overtime	rates	and	even	the	buyout	of	overtime	payments	for	more	highly	paid	actors.	SPI	also	proposed	to	roll	back	time	and	a	half	payments	for	night	and	holiday	work	for	actors	being	paid	more	than	€250	per	day.22	While	discussion	of	these	issues	and	rates	continued,	the	main	focus	of	the	negotiations	continued	to	be	on	use	fees.			After	the	end	of	2003,	negotiations	appear	to	have	slowed,	the	parties	not	meeting	again	for	over	a	year.	When	they	eventually	did,	SPI	characterised	the	union	position	on	residuals	(i.e.	any	attempt	to	introduce	new	use	fee	categories,	or	to	resist	a	reduction	in	the	full	buyout	rate)	as	“stone	age”	and	out	of	step	with	an	era	of	“modern	digital	broadcasting	[that]	will	change	the	way	of	broadcasting	and	selling”.23	After	a	brief	re-engagement,	negotiations	stalled	again.	To	this	day,	14	years	after	deliberations	commenced,	no	new	agreement	has	yet	been	implemented.24	On	the	contrary,	the	record	suggests	that	in	2005,	SPI	went	cold	on	finalising	the	Equity	agreements,	as	it	turned	its	attention	to	devising	a	general	screen	production	agreement	covering	all	film	unions,25	a	process	that	eventually	resulted	in	a	2010	“shooting	crew”	agreement	with	SIPTU,	but	not	with	any	of	the	other	unions.	Indeed	the	implementation	of	that	2010	agreement	has	been	problematic,	owing	to	legal	questions	over	a	“closed	shop”	clause	therein	(Prendergast	2014).		SPI-Equity	talks	have	continued,	with	the	union	continuing	to	press	for	substantial	changes	to	the	buyout	system,	including	new	residuals	payments	and/or	a	share	of	producer	profits.	For	its	part,	SPI	has	been	trying	to	unpick	the	whole	use-fee/residual	structure	from	agreements	and	contracts.	The	result,	unsurprisingly	perhaps,	is	that	negotiations	have	broken	down.	For	some	time,	
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the	Labour	Relations	Commission	has	been	attempting	to	facilitate	a	return	to	the	bargaining	table.26	The	continuing	impasse	has	placed	a	question	mark	under	Irish	Actors’	Equity’s	continued	affiliation	with	SIPTU.	In	2012,	the	actors	voted	to	remain	with	SIPTU	until	late	2014,	retaining	the	option	to	disaffiliate	and	join	instead	with	British	Equity.27	While	this	has	not	yet	happened,	to	some	extent,	it	reflects	a	more	general	turn	towards	the	adoption	of	British	standards.	In	the	absence	of	a	new	agreement,	arrangements	for	some	productions	are	negotiated	on	a	case-by-case	basis.	Incoming	British	productions,	however,	are	generally	made	under	the	PACT-Equity	UK	labour	agreement.				
4.	Conclusions	and	discussion	
It	is	clear,	then,	that	secondary	payments,	whether	classified	as	use	fees	or	residuals,	represent	a	significant	point	of	contention	between	Irish	producers	and	actors	in	recent	decades.	One	of	the	reasons	for	the	current	impasse	appears	to	be	Equity’s	clear	preference	for	the	ongoing	residual	over	the	buyout.	This	begs	the	question	as	to	why,	if	actors	had	conceded	to	a	buyout	system	in	the	early	1990s,	are	they	pushing	for	a	pay-per-play	system	now?	What	is	so	objectionable	about	a	system	that	compensates	actors	in	advance	for	additional	sales	that,	arguably,	might	never	be	achieved?			
Internationalisation	of	Irish	production	
	It	seems	likely	that	part	of	the	answer	lies	in	the	continued	growth	of	the	Irish	production	sector.	Between	1993	and	2001,	when	the	SPI-Equity	negotiations	commenced,	spending	in	the	Irish	economy	on	film,	major	TV	drama	and	animation	more	than	tripled	from	39m	to	142m,	fuelled	mainly	by	a	liberalisation	of	the	Section	481	tax	incentive	making	it	more	attractive	to	both	investors	and	overseas	producers.28	Despite	some	setbacks	in	the	past	decade,	the	continued	modification	of	state	incentives	appears	to	have	restored	levels	of	international	investment	in	recent	years.	Under	such	growth	conditions,	arguably,	actors	might	begin	to	trade	off	the	security	of	the	upfront	payment	for	
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the	less	certain,	but	potentially	more	lucrative,	“pay	per	play”	system,	with	its	long	tail	of	small	residual	payments	–	especially	in	relation	to	international	productions	that	might	be	expected	to	have	a	longer	and	more	profitable	shelf	life	than	domestic	film	and	television	productions.		
The	2000	SAG-AFTRA	strike	
	Another	part	of	the	answer	might	lie	in	the	lesson	from	America.	The	FMI-Equity	negotiations	began	very	shortly	after	the	end	of	the	longest	strike	in	Hollywood	history,	when	members	of	the	Screen	Actors	Guild	(SAG)	and	the	American	Federation	of	Television	and	Radio	Artists	(AFTRA)	withdrew	their	services	for	175	days	following	the	breakdown	of	collective	bargaining	over	residual	payments	for	TV	commercials,	especially	in	regard	to	commercials	on	cable	television	and	new	Internet-based	platforms	(Ackerman	2001).	American	producers	clearly	favoured	a	buyout	system,	trying	to	implement	one	where	it	did	not	exist	(network	TV	commercials)	and	protect	one	where	it	did	(cable	TV	ads).	This,	of	course,	suggests	that	the	buyout	system	is	not	particularly	labour-friendly	compared	to	residual	payments.	As	the	Irish	negotiations	commenced,	both	SPI	and	Equity	would	have	been	highly	aware	of	this	US	precedent,	which	placed	fresh	emphasis	on	the	relative	merits	of	use	fees,	buyouts	and	residuals,	as	well	as	the	potential	value	of	new	distribution	channels	enabled	by	technological	change.		
The	implications	for	labour		So	far,	however,	the	Irish	film	unions	have	failed	to	institutionalise	a	residual	payments	system,	unlike	those	US	(and	UK)	unions	with	enough	clout	to	be	included	within	such	a	system’s	lucrative	embrace.	IE,	which	used	to	enjoy	a	symbiotic	relationship	with	producers	through	its	administration	of	casting	and	payment	processes	in	relation	to	screen	extras	(crowd	artists),	thus	missed	an	important	opportunity	to	achieve	a	similarly	“embedded”	position	in	relation	to	principal	actors.	In	this	matter,	IE	differs	from	its	US	counterpart:	the	
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administration	of	the	Hollywood	residuals	system,	which	involves	the	identification,	payment,	and	tracking	of	over	1.5	million	cheques	per	year	(SAG-AFTRA	2014)	is	so	complex	that	the	major	corporations	rely	heavily	on	the	unions	for	its	successful	operation	(Kleingartner	2001:	118).	Similarly	in	the	UK,	the	above-the-line	body	Directors	UK	is	heavily	involved	in	monitoring,	collecting	and	distributing	royalties	due	to	British	directors	under	agreements	with	UK	producers	and	broadcasters.29	Unlike	their	Irish	counterparts,	these	unions	and	guilds	have	therefore	managed	to	retain	a	vital	role	in	managing	the	employment	relationship,	despite	the	industry’s	vertical	disintegration	and	transition	towards	flexible	labour,	with	concomitant	difficulties	for	organised	labour	(Christopherson	and	Storper	1989).			Most	of	the	other	Irish	film	unions	have	fared	no	better.	For	example,	a	commitment	in	the	2010	SIPTU-SPI	general	shooting	crew	agreement	to	work	towards	the	establishment	of	a	pension	plan	for	film	workers	has	so	far	come	to	nothing.30	These	disappointments	reflect	a	general	decline	of	trade	union	power	in	the	Irish	industry.	The	continued	domination	by	SPI	of	the	other	above	the	line	organizations,	representing	Irish	directors,	writers,	and	musicians,	is	in	marked	contrast	to	their	US	and	UK	counterparts.31			Equity’s	recent	overtures	towards	its	British	counterpart,	however,	reflects	a	heightened	awareness	of	the	need	for	international	labour	cooperation	in	order	to	counteract	the	globalisation	of	production.	The	union	is	also	an	active	member	of	the	International	Federation	of	Actors,	whose	cooperative	activities	include	the	monitoring	of	production	arrangements	across	international	borders	and	the	operation	of	an	“early	warning	system”	that	alerts	international	unions	to	producer	attempts	to	undermine	or	stall	local	labour	agreements.32			
Implications	for	Producers		For	its	part,	Screen	Producers	Ireland	has	been	highly	successful	in	protecting	employer	interests,	with	an	eye	to	the	bigger	picture	beyond	the	“bread	and	
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butter”	issues	of	pay,	conditions	and	buyout/residual	rates.	Firstly,	as	we	have	seen,	while	Equity	initially	resisted	the	buyout	of	“uses	and	platforms	not	yet	invented”,	for	producers	this	was	a	“deal-breaker”.33	That	no	new	deal	was	ever	made	is	in	itself	a	victory	for	producers,	who	managed	to	successfully	defend	the	status	quo	despite	being	in	nominal	negotiation	for	decades.	SPI’s	main	tactic,	as	evident	from	the	prolonged	Equity	negotiations,	appears	to	have	been	the	
avoidance	of	new	binding	agreements.	Its	refusal	in	2001	to	budge	on	new	use	fee	categories	was	highly	prescient,	given	the	emergence	within	a	few	short	years	of	Internet	television	and	VOD	services	like	Netflix,	Hulu,	and	iTunes,	as	well	as	the	rollout	of	Internet	streaming,	catch-up	players,	and	other	services	by	traditional	broadcasters.	Such	platforms	have	been	important	for	the	international	distribution	of	Irish	content,	whether	initially	produced	for	television	or	theatrical	release.	For	example,	two	of	the	most	prominent	Irish	TV	drama	productions	of	recent	years,	Love/Hate	and	Amber,	made	their	US	debuts	on	Hulu	and	Netflix.	The	latter	platform	also	hosts	a	reasonable	number	of	recent	Irish	films.34			Secondly,	SPI’s	early	insistence	on	separate	agreements	for	theatrical	and	television	drama	production	reflected	an	astute	judgement	of	the	future	development	of	screen	production	in	Ireland.35	The	field	is	currently	dominated	by	international	television	productions	from	Ripper	Street	to	Penny	Dreadful	to	
Vikings.	The	ongoing	capture	of	these	international	productions,	however,	cannot	be	taken	for	granted,	as	it	is	arguably	dependent	on	continual	“competitive”	tweaking	of	tax	incentives.	Since	2013,	changes	to	UK	tax	incentives,	offering	a	rebate	of	up	to	25%	of	expenditure	on	“high	end”	television	drama,	has	arguably	reduced	the	relative	attraction	of	Ireland	as	a	shooting	location	for	such	projects.	The	response	has	been	a	further	modification	of	Section	481	to	increase	the	producer	benefit	to	32	percent.	The	new	legislation	has	yet	to	be	approved	by	the	EU,	but	even	if	such	ratification	is	imminent,	the	policy’s	long-	or	even	medium-term	success	cannot	be	guaranteed,	given	the	availability	of	competing	incentives	and	the	highly	mobile	nature	of	film	and	TV	investment	capital.		
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To	date,	however,	Screen	Producers	Ireland	has	successfully	avoided	any	major	concessions	to	screen	labour,	despite	the	industry’s	robust	growth	over	the	past	two	decades.	As	the	IE	case	demonstrates,	the	producers	have	managed	to	resist	the	institutionalisation	of	new	compensation	categories	in	the	face	of	radical	changes	to	television	and	film	distribution,	and	a	proliferation	of	online	entertainment	sources	that	remain	beyond	the	scope	of	the	old	labour	agreements.	Indeed	the	one	labour	agreement	that	SPI	has	signed,	the	2010	SIPTU	shooting	crew	agreement,	has	been	effectively	sidelined	in	the	Labour	Court	over	its	“closed	shop”	clause.	Screen	Producers	Ireland,	in	representing	producer	employers	during	a	time	of	intense	technological	and	regulatory	change,	has	clearly	demonstrated	a	notable	sensitivity	to	the	implications	of	that	change,	at	the	same	time	exercising	considerable	power	over	screen	acting	and	production	labour.			 	
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Appendix	I	
Film	Employer	and	Labour	organizations	in	Ireland,	UK	and	USA			 Producer	Bodies	 Unions	and	Guilds	IRL	 Screen	Producers	Ireland	(SPI)		
• Services	Industrial	Professional	and	Technical	Union	(SIPTU)	
• Building	and	Allied	Trades	Union	(BATU)	
• Operative	Plasterers	and	Allied	Trades	Society	of	Ireland	(OPATSI)	
• Irish	Actors’	Equity	
• Screen	Directors	Guild	of	Ireland	(SDGI)	
• Writers	Guild	of	Ireland	(WGI)	
UK	 Producers	Alliance	for	Cinema	and	Television	(PACT)	
• Broadcasting,	Entertainment,	Cinematograph	and	Theatre	Union	(BECTU)	
• Equity	
• Directors	Guild	of	Great	Britain	(DGGB)	
• Writers	Guild	of	Great	Britain	(WGGB).	
USA	 Alliance	of	Motion	Picture	and	Television	Producers	(AMPTP)	
• International	Alliance	of	Theatrical	and	Stage	Employees	(IATSE)	
• International	Brotherhood	of	Electrical	Workers	(IBEW)	
• Teamsters	Local	399	
• Screen	Actors	Guild	-	American	Federation	of	Television	and	Radio	Artists	(SAG-AFTRA)	
• Writers	Guild	of	America	(WGA)	
• Directors	Guild	of	America	(DGA)	
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Appendix	IIa	
	Use	Fees	(Theatrical)			
	 	 	
Theatrical	films	 1994	 2000	(IE	proposal)*	 2006**	Theatrical	 USA/	Canada	 50%	 50%	 50%	Rest	of	world	 50%	 50%	 50%	Terrestrial	TV	 USA	major	network	 45%	 45%	 45%	USA	network	other	 20%	 20%	 20%	Rest	of	world	(excl.	UK)	 15%	 17%	 17%	UK/Irl	(3	tx	in	5	years)	 20%	 20%	 	n/a	UK/Irl	additional	txs	 10%	 10%	UK	secondary	TV	 n/a	 13%	UK/Irl	(all	tx)	 n/a	 n/a	 35%	Pay	TV	 USA	 30%	 30%	 30%	Rest	of	world	(inc.	UK)	 8%	 8%	 8%	Videograms	 World	Video/DVD:		 25%	 25%	 25%	
	 Total	(full	buyout)	 273%	 288%	 280%			*	SPI	proposes	basic	fee	increase	to	£120/day	(£480/week)		**	2006	Min	salary:	€153	per	day	(€612	per	/	week)		 (source:	SIPTU	archives)	 	
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Appendix	IIb	
Use	Fees	(TV)			
Television	Drama	 1994	 2003	(SPI	proposal)*	 2006**	RoI/UK	TV	 1st	ROI	and	1st	UK	tx	 Included		 Included	 Included	2nd	UK/ROI	tx	 35%	 Included	 35%	3rd	UK/ROI	tx	 35%	 35%	(UK	only)	 35%	Complete	RoI	buyout	 n/a	 25%	 n/a	Theatrical	 Theatrical	UK/ROI	 10%	 10%	 10%	USA	Free	TV	 Prime	time	:	1st	tx	 75%	 50%	(all	US	commercial	terrestrial	TV)	
75%	Prime	time:	2nd	tx	 25%	 25%	Prime	time	(per	additional)		 5%	 5%	Non	prime:	1st	tx	 25%	 25%	Non-prime:	(per	additional)		 5%	 5%	Syndication	 15%	 15%	PBS	 10%	 10%	 10%	USA/UK	Cable	 Basic	cable	(UK/US)	 10%	 10%	 10%	Pay	TV	 World	 20%	 20%	 20%	Video	 World		 7.5%	 7.5%	 7.5%	
	 Total	(Full	buyout)	 277.5%	 167.5%	 277.5%		*	Basic	rate	of	€230/day	(€920/week)	to	include:	
• 2	UK	and	3	Irish	tx	(incl.	repeats	within	7	days)	
• All	world	TV	including	basic	cable	and	theatric	(except	UK	and	USA)	and	all	world	non-theatric	**	2006	Min	rates	€200	per	day	(€800	per	week)	 (source:	SIPTU	archives)	
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NOTES																																																								1	Despite	labelling	itself	“independent”,	this	sector	enjoys	substantial	state	aid	from	the	Irish	Film	Board,	the	Broadcasting	Authority	of	Ireland,	the	Section	481	tax	incentive	scheme,	and	the	Creative	Europe	programme.	Thanks	to	these	and	other	initiatives,	Ireland	supports	a	mature	indigenous	production	industry	while	also	capturing	a	significant	amount	of	international	“runaway”	production.	
2	Mosco	acknowledges	that	the	field	of	audience	studies	is	aware	of	the	labour	of	media	consumers.	The	term	“blind	spot”	is	drawn	from	Smythe’s	audience	commodification	thesis,	which	proposed	that	the	most	important	“product”	of	the	mass	media	is	not	ideological	messages,	but	rather	the	mass	audience	that	does	the	mental	“work”	of	processing	these	messages	(Smythe	1981).	
3	SIPTU	was	formed	in	1990	with	the	merger	of	Ireland’s	two	largest	trade	unions,	the	Irish	Transport	and	General	Workers	Union	(ITGWU)	and	the	Federated	Workers	Union	of	Ireland	(FWUI).	
4	Collectively,	these	below-the-line	unions,	along	with	Irish	Actors	Equity,	are	sometimes	referred	to	the	Film	Production	Group	of	Unions	(FPGU).	
5	IE	is	affililiated	to	SIPTU,	having	merged	with	the	ITGWU	in	1979	(Devine	1997:	21).	IE	forms	part	of	SIPTU’s	Arts	and	Culture	division.		
6	For	US	TV	commercial	actors,	80	percent	of	income	is	from	residuals.	For	TV	drama	actors,	the	figure	is	66	percent.	For	US	actors	in	general,	residuals	make	up	about	50	percent	of	income	(Paul	and	Kleingartner	1994:	672).	
7	Letter,	Hickey	to	Barrington,	11/6/01.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
8	Interview	with	trade	union	executive,	28/4/14.	
9	Film	Makers	Ireland	became	Screen	Producers	Ireland	in	2003.	
10	Letter,	Hickey	to	Barrington,	11/6/01.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
11	SIPTU	was	proposing	a	20	percent	basic	pay	increase	to	£120/day	(£480/wk).	
12	EU	legislation	giving	basis	to	intellectual	property	rights	had	been	adopted	in	Ireland	in	2000	with	the	Copyright	and	Related	Rights	Act.	
13	The	proposed	maximum	buyout	would	rise	from	273	to	288	percent	of	base	pay.	See	also	Appendix	II.	
14	Letter,	Hickey	to	Barrington,	11/6/01.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
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																																																																																																																																																														15	Letter,	Banotti	to	Brown,	5/12/00.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
16	Letter,	FMI	to	Equity,	11/6/01,	p4.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
17	Letter,	Ryan	to	Browne,	1/7/01.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
18	Meeting	notes,	30/9/2003.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
19	Meeting	notes,	18/2/03.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
20	SPI	appears	to	have	been	offering	€230	per	day/€920	per	week,	while	Equity	was	seeking	€250/€1000.	(Meeting	notes	25/11/03.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive).	
21	Meeting	notes,	12/11/03.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
22	Meeting	notes,	contracts	sub-committee,	25/11/03.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
23	Meeting	notes,	4/12/04.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
24	Interview	with	trade	union	official,	16/4/14.	
25	Letter,	Byrne	to	Boushell,	1/11/04;	Letter,	Lowe	to	film	unions,	29/4/05.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.	
26	Interviews	with	trade	union	official,	16/4/14	and	SPI	representative	8/5/14.	
27	Interview	with	trade	union	official,	16/4/14.	See	also	Dowling	2012,	2013.	
28	Extrapolated	from	IBEC	AV	Production	Reports	2000-2002.	
29	Directors	UK	originated	within,	but	is	now	seperate	from,	the	Directors	Guild	of	Great	Britain.	
30	Interview	with	trade	union	official,	23/9/14.	
31	A	detailed	analysis	of	UK	residuals	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper,	but	a	brief	perusal	of	UK	writer	and	director	guild	websites	reveals	many	agreements	with	broadcasters	and	producers	(Writers	Guild	GB	2014,	Directors	UK	2014).	
32	Interview	with	trade	union	official	16/4/04.	
33	Letter,	Banotti	to	Browne	and	Barrington,	23/7/01.	Box	SA002.	SIPTU	Archive.		
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